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ABSTRACT
We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that,
compared to nonfamily firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts
and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is con-
sistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon, better mon-
itoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners
and managers, the higher likelihood of earnings warnings is consistent with
family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. We also
document that family ownership dominates nonfamily insider ownership and
concentrated institutional ownership in explaining the likelihood of voluntary
disclosure. Using alternative proxies for the founding family’s presence in the
firm leads to similar results.
1. Introduction
A family firm is a firm where members of the founding family continue to
hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders
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of the company. As an important organization form, it accounts for approx-
imately 46% of the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500 index firms.1 Family
firms are characterized by the founding family’s concentrated ownership
and the founding family members’ active involvement in the firms’ manage-
ment either as top executives or as directors. On average, founding families
hold around 18% of equity and 22% of directorships, and hold the CEO
position in 62% of family firms. These distinguishing features can poten-
tially affect such firms’ financial disclosure choices. However, despite the
prevalence of family firms and the substantial ownership of family members
in these firms, our understanding of the financial disclosure choices of this
unique organization form is limited.
The voluntary disclosure literature generally treats shareholders as a uni-
form group and an important maintained assumption is that shareholders
prefer more voluntary disclosure to less.2 However, recent studies find that
not all shareholders are alike. In particular, investors with concentrated
ownership have different preferences for disclosure from others, but the
extant evidence is mixed. On the one hand, Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta
[2005] and Karamanou and Vafeas [2005] find that firms with large insti-
tutional investors and more concentrated insider equity holdings are less
likely to provide management forecasts. On the other hand, Ali, Chen, and
Radhakrishnan [2007] report evidence that family firms are more likely to
provide quarterly forecasts, although only when firm performance is poor.
We continue this line of research and investigate the voluntary disclosure
practices of family firms.
Family firms’ unique ownership structure has important implications for
their voluntary disclosure practices. First, family owners have longer invest-
ment horizons than other shareholders (e.g., Anderson and Reeb [2003],
Villalonga and Amit [2006]). This implies that: (1) the benefits of accel-
erating timely information documented in prior research (e.g., McNichols
and Trueman [1994]), such as trading profits, accrue less to family owners,
and (2) family owners stand to bear the potential costs, such as proprietary
costs or costs arising from managers’ emphasis on short-term rather than
long-term performance. Second, family owners’ active involvement in firms’
management results in lower information asymmetry between themselves
and managers. Moreover, because of the better monitoring of managers
by family owners, the demand for information from nonfamily owners to
monitor managers is lower due to the substitutive relation between direct
monitoring and public disclosure (Bushman et al. [2004]). The above argu-
ments thus imply that family owners prefer less public voluntary disclosure.
1 Our definition of a family firm is consistent with the definition used in the family firm
literature (see, e.g., Anderson and Reeb [2003]). The percentage of family firms in our paper
is larger than that reported in prior research due to our inclusion of S&P MidCap 400 firms
and S&P SmallCap 600 firms.
2 See, for example, Ajinkya and Gift [1984], Amihud and Mendelson [1986], Diamond and
Verrecchia [1991], Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki [2003], Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo [2004].
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However, founding families’ concentrated, and usually underdiversified,
equity holdings in their firms imply that they are more likely to internalize
both the benefits of voluntary disclosure and the costs of nondisclosure,
which leads them to prefer more voluntary disclosure than other owners.
Prior research (e.g., Welker [1995], Botosan [1997]) finds that voluntary
disclosure can reduce the cost of capital. Also, it has been well documented
in the literature that firms have incentives to voluntarily disclose bad news so
as to preempt litigation (e.g., Skinner [1994], Field, Lowry, and Shu [2005]).
Litigation is costly not only because of attorney fees and potential monetary
settlements, but also because of the opportunity costs of managers’ time
and effort taken away from value-adding activities. Withholding bad news
also imposes reputation costs, since investors dislike negative earnings sur-
prises (Skinner [1994]). Family owners’ concentrated and underdiversified
holdings suggest that the benefits of disclosure (reduced cost of capital)
and the costs of withholding bad news are more important to family owners
than to other shareholders, leading to family owners’ preference of more
disclosures.
Lastly, in the case of bad news disclosure, managers’ career concerns may
come into play. As discussed above, family owners have greater litigation and
reputation cost concerns. But such concerns may be offset by the greater
career concerns of nonfamily managers: Managers in nonfamily firms can
face greater job security threats if the firm is sued due to withholding bad
news. This can give nonfamily firms stronger incentives to voluntarily give
out bad news earnings warnings than family firms.
To sum up, the unique characteristics of family ownership imply that fam-
ily owners have different preferences for voluntary disclosure from other
owners.3 Since family owners are influential over corporate decisions, by
serving as CEO and/or by holding directorship, they can tilt firms’ disclo-
sure toward their preferences. However, as discussed above, it is unclear, ex
ante, whether family owners prefer more, or less, voluntary disclosure. Thus,
whether family firms on average provide more or less voluntary disclosure
is ultimately an empirical question.4
As in many other studies of voluntary disclosure, in this paper we use
the likelihood of management forecasts to proxy for voluntary disclosure.
We adopt a multiple logit regression approach to control for the effects of
other aspects of ownership structure (such as institutional ownership and the
3 Another implication of founding families’ concentrated equity ownership is the potential
entrenchment of founding families. However, as discussed in detail in section 2, we do not
believe that entrenchment has significant implications for family firms’ voluntary disclosure
practices.
4 We focus on family owners’ preferences for voluntary disclosure, or the net impact of
family ownership on voluntary disclosure practices, without distinguishing whether the net
result is driven by supply of, or demand for, voluntary disclosure. Depending on their positions
in the firms, family owners’ preferences for voluntary disclosure are reflected in their demand
for information as investors (i.e., when they do not serve as managers) or their supply of
information when they serve as managers.
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existence of outside blockholders), corporate governance, the information
environment, litigation risk, firm size, growth opportunities, performance,
demand for external capital, and industry membership.
Based on 4,415 firm-years from the S&P 1500 index firms in the period
1996–2000, we find that family firms exhibit a lower likelihood of providing
management forecasts than nonfamily firms. Specifically, the likelihood of
providing management forecasts is 8.1 percentage points lower for family
firms than for nonfamily firms, ceteris paribus. The lower propensity of
voluntary disclosure in family firms is evident in both good news forecasts
(9.0 percentage points lower) and bad news forecasts (5.4 percentage points
lower). This is economically significant given that only 36% (44%) of the
sample voluntarily disclose good news (bad news). These results suggest
that the preferences for less voluntary disclosure arising from family owners’
longer investment horizon and active involvement in management outweigh
family owners’ cost of capital considerations.
We document qualitatively similar results when using family equity own-
ership or an alternative family firm definition requiring greater than 5%
family ownership to capture the founding family’s presence. We also find
that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms are less likely to hold con-
ference calls, another important channel of voluntary disclosure.5
Since the incentives for providing management forecasts likely vary with
forecast horizon, we separately examine earnings warnings, short-run fore-
casts, and long-run forecasts. Earnings warnings refer to forecasts disclosed
between fiscal period-ends and earnings announcements, short-run fore-
casts refer to forecasts of earnings to be announced within a quarter ex-
cluding earnings warnings, and long-run forecasts refer to forecasts with a
horizon longer than a quarter.6 We document that, relative to nonfamily
firms, family firms are less likely to issue long-run forecasts and short-run
good news forecasts, but interestingly, they are more likely to issue bad news
earnings warnings. This latter finding is consistent with family owners be-
ing more concerned with the litigation-related costs and reputation costs of
withholding bad news.
Our paper contributes to the voluntary disclosure literature by provid-
ing evidence on the impact of ownership structure on voluntary disclosure
practices. In contrast to the conventional wisdom that all shareholders prefer
more voluntary disclosure of timely information, we find that family own-
ers on average prefer less voluntary disclosure. This result extends Ajinkya,
5 Since we examine public voluntary disclosure, our results do not speak to private manage-
rial earnings guidance given to analysts and institutional investors. Also, private guidance is
no longer feasible in the post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period (i.e., after October 2000) and
public voluntary disclosure may have changed as a result; thus our results may not hold in the
post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period.
6 Note that the term “long-run” is in a relative sense. Most long-run forecasts in our sample
have a forecast horizon less than one year and therefore still reveal timely information about
firm performance.
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Bhojraj, and Sengupta [2005] and Karamanou and Vafeas [2005], who find
that firms with concentrated institutional holdings and concentrated insider
equity holdings have a tendency to disclose less. Compared to large insti-
tutional owners or nonfamily insiders, family owners not only have greater
incentives but also have more direct means to influence disclosure prac-
tices, due to their long investment horizon and active involvement in man-
agement. Thus, family owners likely play a more dominant role in affecting
firms’ voluntary disclosure. Consistent with this argument, we document
that founding family ownership subsumes nonfamily insider ownership and
concentrated institutional holdings in explaining firms’ voluntary disclosure
behavior.
Furthermore, we extend Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007] by sep-
arately examining earnings warnings and earnings forecasts. We find that
family firms are more likely to give out bad news earnings warnings, but are
less likely to provide earnings forecasts. These results are consistent with
family owners’ incentives to lower expected litigation and reputation costs
in the case of earnings warnings and to reduce the costs of disclosing timely
information in the case of earnings forecasts.
Our paper also complements recent studies on the implications of family
ownership for earnings quality and sheds light on the underlying reason for
their results. Both Wang [2006] and Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007]
find that family firms have higher earnings quality relative to nonfamily
firms. Their finding seems to be at odds with ours as higher quality manda-
tory disclosure improves, but less voluntary disclosure arguably reduces,
the quality of firms’ information environment. One potential explanation
for these seemingly conflicting results is the lower short-term capital mar-
ket pressure faced by family firms due to family owners’ long investment
horizon. This is also substantiated by the fact that, in our sample, family
firms have lower institutional holdings, lower analyst coverage, and fewer
issuances of public debt and equity than other firms. With weaker incentives
to meet or beat markets’ expectations of earnings, family firms are less likely
to manage earnings, leading to high quality earnings, and are less likely to
guide expectations, leading to less disclosure of timely information. Thus,
both sets of results are consistent with the notion that managers subject
to less capital market pressure are less likely to place undue emphasis on
short-term financial reporting (Stein [1989]).
Unlike extant studies on family firms (e.g., Anderson and Reeb [2003],
Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007]), we employ a much broader sample:
We examine S&P 1500 firms instead of S&P 500 firms. With the inclusion of
S&P MidCap and SmallCap index firms, the sample has a larger variation
in both family ownership and disclosure behavior. This leads to potentially
more powerful tests, and more importantly, it allows us to generalize our
inference to a broader segment of the economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews
prior literature and develops our hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the sample
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and research design. Section 4 presents our empirical results, and section 5
concludes.
2. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development
2.1 EXTANT LITERATURE ON SHAREHOLDER INTEREST
AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
A long-standing literature shows that voluntary disclosure reduces the
cost of capital and supports the conventional wisdom that shareholders, as
a uniform group, prefer more voluntary disclosure of timely information.
The theoretical literature on voluntary disclosure holds that shareholders
benefit from more voluntary disclosure, since voluntary disclosure can re-
duce the cost of capital by reducing transaction costs (Amihud and Mendel-
son [1986], Diamond and Verrecchia [1991]) or nondiversifiable estima-
tion risk (Barry and Brown [1985], Coles and Loewenstein [1988], Coles,
Loewenstein, and Suay [1995]). Empirical evidence is generally consistent
with these theoretical predictions (e.g., Botosan [1997], Healy, Hutton, and
Palepu [1999], Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo [2004]).
However, findings of several recent studies question this conventional
wisdom and suggest that not all shareholders have the same preferences.
Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta [2005] find that concentrated institutional
ownership is associated with a lower likelihood of management forecasts.
Karamanou and Vafeas [2005] document that the likelihood of manage-
ment forecasts decreases with insider ownership. If these results extend to
family ownership, one might expect that family owners, being insiders and
having concentrated ownership, prefer less disclosure as well. However, a
more recent paper, Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007], finds that, among
S&P 500 firms, family firms are more, rather than less, likely to provide quar-
terly forecasts than nonfamily firms when firm performance is poor.
Thus, whereas the majority of voluntary disclosure research maintains that
shareholders prefer more voluntary disclosure of timely information, recent
studies document a differential association between concentrated stock own-
ership and voluntary disclosure. In this paper, we use a unique setting, family
versus nonfamily firms, to further examine the effect of ownership structure,
specifically family ownership, on voluntary disclosure choices.7 Compared
to other shareholders, family owners have a longer investment horizon,
better monitoring of management, better access to information, and con-
centrated ownership. In the next section, we discuss the implication of these
characteristics for family firms’ voluntary disclosure practices. Since found-
ing family members have the means—serving as the CEO and/or holding
7 To our knowledge, the study of Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007] is the only study that
has examined the differences in voluntary disclosure practices between family and nonfamily
firms. Karamanou and Vafeas [2005] do not distinguish insider holdings along the family versus
nonfamily dichotomy; therefore, they do not directly examine the impact of founding family
presence on firms’ voluntary disclosure behavior.
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directorship—to influence firms’ disclosure practices toward their prefer-
ences, we use family owners’ preferences for voluntary disclosure and family
firms’ disclosure practices interchangeably.
2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Compared to other shareholders, family owners have a longer investment
horizon. Existing research (e.g., Casson [1999], Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb
[2003]) argues that founding families view their ownership as an asset to
pass on to their descendents, rather than wealth to consume during their
lifetimes. McNichols and Trueman [1994] show that disclosure of timely
information is of no value to long-term shareholders in terms of trading
profits. In addition, long-horizon shareholders have to bear the potential
costs arising from voluntary disclosure of timely information. Prominent
investors and researchers, such as Warren Buffet and Fuller and Jensen
[2002], argue that the practice of disclosing short-term earnings can induce
managers to manage earnings and/or invest in projects with short-term gains
while sacrificing long-term performance. Indeed, Kasznik [1999] finds that
managers engage in earnings management in order to meet or beat their
own forecasts of earnings. Voluntary disclosure can also be costly if it divulges
valuable information to competitors and attracts competition by disclosing
the profitability of a particular business.8 To sum up, this discussion suggests
that founding families, with longer investment horizons, likely face more
potential costs than benefits from disclosure of timely information, and as
a result, they prefer less disclosure.
Furthermore, compared to other owners, family owners are usually more
actively involved in firm management by serving as executives and/or direc-
tors. Thus, family owners have better access to information and can better
monitor management, reducing the agency problem between management
and shareholders. As direct monitoring and corporate disclosure are sub-
stitutes in alleviating agency problems, as shown in Bushman et al. [2004],
other shareholders can free ride on family owners’ monitoring of managers
and have lower demand for public information. This again implies that
family firms disclose less.
Relative to other shareholders, family owners usually have large concen-
trated equity holdings and are less diversified—their fortunes are dispro-
portionately tied up in their ownership of the firm. This implies that they
8 Management forecasts, our main proxy for voluntary disclosure, are usually issued in the
form of a detailed press release, which contains not only forecasts of future earnings but
also other information, such as new contracts, new product lines, and segment profitability.
Consistent with this argument, Hutton, Miller, and Skinner [2003] find that managers generally
provide supplemental information to accompany their management forecasts, increasing the
probability of disclosing proprietary information. We also investigate an alternative measure
of voluntary disclosure, conference calls, which likely also contains proprietary information
since conference calls are usually detailed and include a question-and-answer session between
executives and analysts.
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are more likely to internalize both the benefits of voluntary disclosure and
the costs of nondisclosure. Prior research demonstrates that voluntary dis-
closure leads to lower bid–ask spreads, lower information risk, and lower
cost of raising capital (Welker [1995], Bostosan [1997], Healy, Hutton, and
Palepu [1999]). This suggests that family owners, who stand to gain greater
benefits, prefer more public disclosure.
In addition, Skinner [1994] and Kasznik and Lev [1995] document that
firms with bad news have greater incentives to warn investors in order to
preempt potential litigation and reduce litigation-related costs.9 Litigation-
related costs include not only direct costs, such as attorney fees and settle-
ment costs, but also indirect costs, such as opportunity costs of managers’
time and effort spent on dealing with the litigation, rather than on value-
adding activities (Dabrowski [1994]). In addition, not disclosing bad news
can lead to reputation costs, since investors and analysts dislike negative
earnings surprises and may impose costs on firms withholding bad news
(e.g., Skinner [1994, 1997]; Hutton [2007]). Although direct litigation costs
may be immaterial, both opportunity costs and reputation costs can be sub-
stantial.10 Family owners, with large and underdiversified equity holdings
that usually span multigenerations, are arguably more concerned with the
negative impact on firm value of such costs, and are more likely to give out
earnings warnings. Lastly, CEOs’ career concerns can also play a role in the
setting of disclosing bad news. There is some evidence that CEOs are more
likely to be fired after involvement in disclosure-related lawsuits (Niehaus
and Roth [1998]). To the extent that CEOs in nonfamily firms face greater
job security concerns than CEOs in family firms, managers in nonfamily
firms are more motivated to give earnings warnings, a prediction opposite
to the one above.
Thus, ex ante, it is unclear whether family firms disclose more than non-
family firms, or less. Therefore, our hypothesis is nondirectional and we
address this issue empirically:
H1: The likelihood of voluntary disclosure is systematically different
between family and nonfamily firms.
Another implication of founding families’ concentrated equity holdings
and active involvement in management is that founding families might be
entrenched. We do not examine this potential agency conflict for two rea-
sons. First, extant studies in both finance and accounting find no evidence of
severe entrenchment of founding families in U.S. family firms, likely due to
the better shareholder protection and law enforcement in the United States
9 However, empirical evidence on whether firms can successfully preempt litigation by dis-
closing bad news is mixed (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper [1994], Skinner [1997], Field,
Lowry, and Shu [2005].
10 For example, based on data in the period 1988–1994, Skinner [1997] documents that the
majority of disclosure-related lawsuits are settled and that the median value of settlement is
$5.28 million, about 3% of annual sales.
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(La Porta et al. (1998, 2000)). They find that, compared to their nonfamily
counterparts, U.S. family firms exhibit better accounting and stock perfor-
mance (e.g., Anderson and Reeb [2003]) and higher earnings quality (Wang
[2006], Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007]). Second, unlike in other set-
tings (e.g., investment decisions, security pricing), entrenchment may not
have a significant impact on voluntary disclosure decisions. It is unlikely
that voluntary disclosure of timely information, either through management
forecasts or conference calls, can help reveal or hide evidence of entrench-
ment (e.g., related party transaction, excessive executive compensation).
3. Sample and Research Design
3.1 SAMPLE AND DATA
Our sample consists of 4,415 firm-years from 1,311 firms in the S&P 1500
index (S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600 indices) covering
the period 1996–2000. These are the firms that have the required data from
Compustat (for financial accounting information), the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) (for stock return information), I/B/E/S (for
analyst coverage information), ExecuComp, and the Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC) (for ownership and board information).
Following prior research (e.g., Anderson and Reeb [2003]), family firms
refer to firms in which founders or their family members (by either blood
or marriage) are key executives, directors, or blockholders.11 While widely
used in the literature, this definition might be viewed as rather “lenient,”
particularly due to the lack of restriction on the level of family ownership.
Thus, in our empirical analysis, we also use two more proxies to capture
an economically significant presence of founding families: (1) continuous
family ownership and (2) an alternative classification of family firms—firms
where the members of the founding family have an equity ownership of 5%
or higher.
Our collection of ownership and founding family–related information in-
volves several steps. First, we start with the ExecuComp and IRRC databases
to identify key insiders (top executives and directors) for each company and
compile ownership of each insider. Second, for each firm-year, we collect
information about the founding family: the identity of founders, whether
founders or their family members are actively involved (e.g., holding key
executive positions, being directors, or being blockholders), and if they
are actively involved, the ownership of the founding family. This step is
completed through examining Hoover’s Company Records, company proxy
statements, or Web sites. Third, based on proxy statements, we compile the
11 Note that our family firm classification is verified and updated every year. In contrast,
some prior studies rely on Business Week classifications of S&P 500 in one year and extend this
classification to other years; this approach leads to misclassification for firms that change their
status during the sample period.
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identities and ownership of blockholders other than insiders and founding
family members. Lastly, we merge the above information with firm perfor-
mance and characteristics data from Compustat, CRSP, and I/B/E/S. Addi-
tional information about corporate governance and institutional ownership
is collected from IRRC and CDA Spectrum, respectively.
As is common in the literature, we use management forecasts as our pri-
mary proxy for voluntary disclosure. We obtain the data from First Call’s
Company Issued Guidelines database, which has comprehensive coverage
of management forecasts since 1995.12 Because our interest is on the re-
lation between firm type and voluntary disclosure in general, we include
all types of management forecasts: annual and quarterly forecasts of earn-
ings, cash flows, or other performance measures (such as revenues); they
can all potentially reveal managers’ private information. Also, we treat mul-
tiple forecasts by the same firm on the same day as one forecast; these
forecasts are generally issued in the same press release, for example, one
for next quarter and one for next year, or one for earnings and one for
revenue.13
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN
To test our hypothesis, we regress the probability of management forecasts
on a family firm indicator and control variables, using the following logit
regression:
PROB(VDi,t+1 = 1) = α + β1FOWN i,t + β2INST i,t + β3BLOCK i,t
+ β4ACi,t + β5DISPi,t + β6RVOLi,t + β7BDINDi,t
+ β8BDSIZEi,t + β9LIT i,t + β10SIZEi,t + β11MTBi,t
+ β12 D CAPi,t+1 + β13ROAi,t+1 + β14 B ARi,t+1
+
year∑
dummies
+
industry∑
dummies
+ εi,t (1)
where:
VD = the voluntary disclosure indicator variable, coded as 1 if there
are one or more management forecasts in year t+1, and 0 oth-
erwise;
FOWN = a dummy variable with a value of 1 for family firms and 0 oth-
erwise;
12 To address the concern that family firms may be less likely to be covered by First Call
because of their smaller size, in an untabulated analysis we only include firms with at least one
management forecast in the sample period. The results are qualitatively similar.
13 In a later analysis, we also separately analyze management forecasts of different horizons.
For that analysis, we separately count the number of earnings warnings, short-run forecasts,
and long-run forecasts, even if they are issued on the same day.
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INST = percentage institutional ownership in year t;
BLOCK = the blockholder indicator variable, defined as 1 if there is
an outside blockholder (i.e., a nonmanagement, nondirector,
non–founding family blockholder) in year t;
AC = the number of financial analysts following the firm in year t;
DISP = analyst forecast dispersion in year t, measured as the standard
deviation of one-year-ahead earnings per share (EPS) forecasts
scaled by the absolute mean forecast; we use the most recent
consensus forecast before the end of year t;
RVOL = return volatility, measured as the standard deviation of daily
stock returns in year t;
BDIND = the board independence indicator in year t, measured as 1 if
more than 60% of the directors are independent, and 0 other-
wise; as in prior research, independent directors refer to those
who are not corporate executives and have no business rela-
tionship with the company;
BDSIZE = board size in year t, measured as the number of directors on
the board;
LIT = a high litigation risk indicator, coded as 1 for industries with
high litigation risk (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
codes 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 7370–7374, 3600–3674, 5200–
5961, 8731–8734), and 0 otherwise;
SIZE = natural log of year t total assets;
MTB = the year t market-to-book ratio;
D CAP = an indicator variable coded as 1 if firms issue any debt or equity
offering (per Securities Data Company (SDC)) in year t+1;
ROA = return on assets in year t+1, measured as income before ex-
traordinary items divided by total assets;
B AR = a poor performance indicator, defined as 1 if the market-
adjusted stock return in year t+1 is lower than the sam-
ple median, and 0 otherwise; this variable is included
only when explaining the likelihood of good or bad news
disclosure;
i,t = firm i in year t.
Because the incentives to disclose good news can be different from those
to disclose bad news, we estimate the above equation separately for volun-
tary disclosure defined based on (1) all management forecasts, (2) good
news management forecasts, and (3) bad news management forecasts. For
the second (third) case, the dependent variable VD is one if there is one or
more good (bad) news management forecasts in year t+1 and zero other-
wise, where good (bad) news is defined based on the sign of the three-day
size-adjusted abnormal returns centered on the forecast date (Noe [1999]).
Because some firms appear multiple times in our sample and firms’ volun-
tary disclosure behavior tends to be sticky over time, observations for the
same firm might be correlated. Accordingly, we report the p-values corrected
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for within-firm correlations (through adjusting standard errors for firm-level
clustering in logit regressions).14
We control for other important relevant factors impacting voluntary dis-
closure as documented by prior research. Prior studies (e.g., Ajinkya, Bho-
jraj, and Sengupta [2005], Karamanou and Vafeas [2005]) find that the
likelihood of voluntary disclosure is positively correlated with institutional
ownership (INST), blockholder presence (BLOCK), board independence
(BDIND), and board size (BDSIZE). In addition, firms with greater analyst
following (AC) and greater information asymmetry, proxied by higher fore-
cast dispersion (DISP) and higher return volatility (RVOL), face a greater
demand for information and are more likely to disclose (Hutton [2005],
Ajinkya and Gift [1984]). Prior research (e.g., Skinner [1994]) also finds
that firms with a high litigation risk (LIT) are more likely to voluntarily dis-
close bad news. We further control for firm size (SIZE) and growth (MTB).
Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson [1995] document that firms with a greater
need for external capital might voluntarily disclose more information to
reduce information asymmetry; hence, we include an indicator variable
(D CAP) for firms having any debt or equity offering in year t+1.15 We con-
trol for contemporaneous accounting performance (ROA) because it can
affect the voluntary disclosure decision (Miller [2002]) and differs between
family and nonfamily firms (Anderson and Reeb [2003]). In addition, we
follow Cheng and Lo [2006] and include a dichotomous firm performance
variable (B AR) when explaining the likelihood of issuing a good or bad
news management forecast. Lastly, we include year and industry dummies
(per Fama and French [1997]) to control for the variation of disclosure over
time and across industries. Note that except for D CAP , ROA, and B AR ,
which are measured contemporaneously with the dependent variable, all
other independent variables are lagged by one year.
4. Empirical Results
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON FIRM CHARACTERISTICS
Panel A of table 1 reports the composition of our sample. In contrast to
prior family firm studies that focus on S&P 500 or Fortune 500 firms, our
sample includes 1,690 firm-years from the S&P 500 (39% of the sample),
1,194 firm-years from the S&P MidCap 400, and 1,494 firm-years from the
14 We also estimate the regressions by year and the inferences are the same.
15 In an untabulated robustness check, we use an ex ante proxy, which is based on the relative
magnitude of a firm’s free cash flow to its current assets, to capture the need for external capital,
as in prior research (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1996]). The results on the family firm
indicator remain the same. In addition, we also use alternative measures for other variables,
such as using stock price at the beginning of year t as the deflator for forecast dispersion and
using the litigation probability calculated based on the Rogers and Stocken [2005] model to
proxy for litigation risk, and find qualitatively similar results.
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S&P SmallCap 600 indices. Of these, 46% of the firm-years are from family
firms. This percentage is higher than that reported in prior family firm
studies, because family firms on average are smaller and thus comprise a
larger proportion of the S&P 400 and S&P 600 firms than of the S&P 500
firms.
Panel B of table 1 reports summary statistics on firm characteristics sep-
arately for family firms and nonfamily firms. The average family ownership
in family firms is close to 18%. In addition, the founding family is a block-
holder in 70% of the family firms (not tabulated). Statistical tests reveal that
nonfamily firms have significantly greater institutional ownership (63% vs.
57%) and higher outside blockholder ownership (16% vs. 13%), and that a
greater proportion of nonfamily firms have outside blockholders (78% vs.
74%). A typical board has 10 members and 6 of them are independent. Fam-
ily firms have slightly smaller boards and lower board independence than
nonfamily firms. Perhaps because of their different firm sizes (based on ei-
ther market value of equity or total assets), nonfamily firms have a better
information environment than family firms: On average, they have higher
analyst coverage, lower forecast dispersion (though only the difference in
median is significant), and lower return volatility.16
Firm performance, as captured by the market-to-book ratio, return on
assets, and market-adjusted returns, is better for family firms than for non-
family firms. This is consistent with the results reported in prior research
(e.g., Anderson and Reeb [2003]) that family firms, on average, outperform
nonfamily firms. We also find that family firms are less likely to acquire ex-
ternal capital from the debt or equity market: While 26% of nonfamily firms
obtain external capital in the next year, only 14% of family firms do so.
This confirms the notion that family firms are subject to less capital market
pressure, as discussed earlier.
The bottom of panel B reports that litigation risk, as captured by the
industry-based indicator variable, is higher for family firms than for non-
family firms. The difference in industry composition between family and
nonfamily firms is illustrated by the Fama and French [1997] industry classifi-
cation of sample firm-years, as reported in panel C of table 1. Family firms ap-
pear more often than nonfamily firms in high-tech industries (pharmaceu-
tical products, electronic equipment), wholesale and retail, transportation,
and printing and publishing. In contrast, nonfamily firms dominate more
capital-intensive industries (steel works, machinery, automobile, petroleum
and natural gas), regulated industries (utilities, banking and insurance com-
panies), and the business supplies industry. These frequency distributions
indicate the importance of controlling for industry effects in our empirical
tests.
16 This is opposite to the finding in Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007] that family firms
have more analysts following and lower forecast dispersion. The difference could be due to
the fact that Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007] study S&P 500 firms whereas our sample
includes S&P 400 MidCap and S&P 600 SmallCap firms as well as large firms.
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4.2 TESTS OF H1
Table 2 presents the distribution of management forecasts. Panel A shows
that over 56% of the sample firm-years provide management forecasts, and
more forecasts are bad news than good news: 36% of the sample have good
news forecasts and 44% of the sample have bad news forecasts. The majority
of the forecasting firm-years have one or two forecasts. Panel B presents the
difference in management forecast frequency between family and nonfam-
ily firms. The results show that family firms have lower mean and median
management forecast frequency per year, regardless of the nature of the
news revealed in the management forecast, with the differences significant
at better than 1% levels.
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix of voluntary disclosure
likelihood and its determinants. The management forecast indicator vari-
able, VD, is negatively correlated with the family firm indicator variable,
suggesting that family firms are less likely to provide forecasts, consistent
T A B L E 2
Management Forecast Frequency
Panel A: Management forecast frequency for the full sample
All management forecasts Good news forecasts Bad news forecasts
N Percent N Percent N Percent
0 1,916 43.4 2,812 63.7 2,461 55.7
1 963 21.8 896 20.3 1,028 23.3
2 566 12.8 371 8.4 493 11.2
3 346 7.8 182 4.1 248 5.6
4 227 5.1 87 2.0 109 2.5
5 169 3.8 28 0.6 49 1.1
6 94 2.1 21 0.5 15 0.3
7 56 1.3 12 0.3 11 0.3
8 35 0.8 2 0.1 1 0.0
9 23 0.5 2 0.1 0 0.0
10 and above 20 0.5 2 0.1 0 0.0
Total 4,415 100.0 4,415 100.0 4,415 100.0
Panel B: Comparisons of management forecast frequency across firm types
Family firms Nonfamily firms
(N = 2,043) (N = 2,372) p-value of the
difference∗
Std. Std.
Mean Dev. Median Mean Dev. Median Mean Median
All management forecasts 1.344 1.883 1 1.605 2.049 1 0.001 0.001
Good news forecasts 0.586 1.098 0 0.734 1.230 0 0.001 0.001
Bad news forecasts 0.758 1.148 0 0.871 1.246 0 0.002 0.001
This table reports the descriptive statistics of management forecast frequency of our sample, which
consists of 4,415 firm-years from 1,311 firms in the S&P 1500 index covering the period 1996–2000. Multiple
management forecasts issued on the same day by the same firm are treated as one forecast. Management
forecast frequency is the number of management forecasts over the firm-year. Good (bad) news forecasts
are forecasts that experience positive (negative) three-day CARs centered on the forecast date.
aThe differences in means and medians between family and nonfamily firms are tested based on t-tests
and Wilcoxon rank tests, respectively. p-values are two-sided.
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with the results in panel B of table 2. The signs of the correlations between
VD and control variables are largely consistent with results in prior research.
Consistent with what is reported in table 1, family firms differ from nonfam-
ily firms along several dimensions. These significant pairwise correlations
indicate the need to control for these factors in testing the association be-
tween firm type and voluntary disclosure.
We present our tests of H1 in panel A of table 4. Column 1 reports the
logit regression results for the likelihood of all management forecasts, and
T A B L E 4
Testing the Hypothesis: Logit Regression of the Probability of Management Forecast on Founding Family Presence and
Control Variables
Panel A: FOWN = family firm indicator, coded as 1 for firms where the founding family members
continue to hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders, 0 otherwise.
1 2 3
All management Good news Bad news
forecasts forecasts forecasts
Coef. Marginal  Coef. Marginal  Coef. Marginal 
(p-value) in prob. (%) (p-value) in prob. (%) (p-value) in prob. (%)
Intercept −2.615 n/a −3.699 n/a −4.309 n/a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FOWN −0.335 −8.07 −0.409 −8.99 −0.222 −5.43
(0.002) (0.001) (0.028)
INST 0.485 3.03 0.286 1.65 0.330 2.10
(0.061) (0.273) (0.186)
BLOCK 0.048 1.15 0.208 4.52 −0.028 −0.69
(0.658) (0.068) (0.787)
AC 0.074 19.46 0.062 14.97 0.048 12.76
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DISP −1.724 −1.23 −1.099 −0.74 −2.176 −1.61
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001)
RVOL 9.189 3.32 2.321 0.77 12.725 4.66
(0.094) (0.664) (0.014)
BDIND 0.582 3.49 0.307 1.70 0.658 4.03
(0.033) (0.272) (0.016)
BDSIZE 0.027 2.63 0.005 0.41 0.041 4.01
(0.192) (0.825) (0.043)
LIT −0.091 −2.19 −0.062 −1.36 −0.288 −6.97
(0.686) (0.754) (0.178)
SIZE −0.034 −1.86 0.071 3.58 0.039 2.17
(0.546) (0.182) (0.435)
MTB 0.004 0.23 0.010 0.56 −0.019 −1.21
(0.790) (0.474) (0.156)
D CAP 0.289 6.82 0.353 8.07 0.186 4.59
(0.004) (0.001) (0.054)
ROA −2.327 −3.86 0.742 1.14 −1.721 −2.91
(0.001) (0.219) (0.008)
B AR −0.198 −4.38 0.959 23.09
(0.015) (0.001)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.300 0.298 0.313
N 4,415 4,415 4,415
(Continued)
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T A B L E 4 — Continued
Panel B: FOWN = family equity ownership
1 2 3
All management Good news Bad news
forecasts forecasts forecasts
Coef. Marginal  Coef. Marginal  Coef. Marginal 
(p-value) in prob. (%) (p-value) in prob. (%) (p-value) in prob. (%)
Intercept −2.242 n/a −3.699 n/a −3.962 n/a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FOWN −1.904 −4.98 −1.349 −3.33 −1.764 −4.78
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
INST 0.481 3.01 0.325 1.88 0.231 1.47
(0.067) (0.220) (0.355)
BLOCK −0.124 −2.95 0.123 2.70 −0.193 −4.76
(0.252) (0.288) (0.069)
AC 0.069 18.22 0.060 14.45 0.043 11.45
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DISP −1.702 −1.22 −1.014 −0.68 −2.144 −1.59
(0.001) (0.014) (0.001)
RVOL 7.977 2.88 2.423 0.81 11.603 4.25
(0.147) (0.652) (0.024)
BDIND 0.435 2.62 0.370 2.05 0.438 2.68
(0.104) (0.179) (0.095)
BDSIZE 0.022 2.09 −0.000 −0.00 0.040 3.91
(0.289) (0.996) (0.046)
LIT −0.224 −5.44 −0.156 −3.41 −0.398 −9.59
(0.291) (0.426) (0.049)
SIZE −0.036 −1.95 0.080 3.99 0.044 2.47
(0.521) (0.131) (0.371)
MTB 0.005 0.28 0.009 0.51 −0.017 −1.05
(0.753) (0.519) (0.234)
D CAP 0.294 6.93 0.366 8.38 0.170 4.18
(0.004) (0.001) (0.078)
ROA −2.206 −3.66 0.599 0.92 −1.776 −3.00
(0.001) (0.323) (0.007)
B AR −0.207 −4.59 0.960 23.11
(0.010) (0.001)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.307 0.297 0.319
N 4,415 4,415 4,415
(Continued)
columns 2 and 3 report the results for the likelihood of good news forecasts
and bad news forecasts, respectively. We find that, relative to nonfamily firms,
family firms are less likely to issue management forecasts, and this holds for
both good news and bad news management forecasts. The coefficient on
FOWN in all models is significantly negative at better than the 5% level
(two-sided).
The results on the control variables are largely consistent with predic-
tions and prior research. Management forecast likelihood increases with
institutional ownership, analyst coverage, return volatility, board indepen-
dence, and demand for external capital. The coefficient on the litigation
risk dummy is insignificant, due to our inclusion of industry dummies. While
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T A B L E 4 — Continued
Panel C: FOWN = family firm indicator, coded as 1 if family ownership ≥5%, 0 otherwise.
1 2 3
All management Good news Bad news
forecasts forecasts forecasts
Coef. Marginal  Coef. Marginal  Coef. Marginal 
(p-value) in prob. (%) (p-value) in prob. (%) (p-value) in prob. (%)
Intercept −2.567 n/a −3.770 n/a −4.071 n/a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FOWN −0.344 −8.36 −0.364 −7.89 −0.411 −9.92
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
INST 0.459 2.86 0.262 1.51 0.201 1.28
(0.080) (0.320) (0.425)
BLOCK 0.025 0.61 0.196 4.27 −0.069 −1.71
(0.815) (0.086) (0.508)
AC 0.071 18.71 0.060 14.47 0.046 12.22
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DISP −1.751 −1.25 −1.133 −0.76 −2.155 −1.60
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001)
RVOL 8.920 3.23 2.344 0.78 11.332 4.15
(0.106) (0.665) (0.028)
BDIND 0.574 3.45 0.386 2.14 0.495 3.03
(0.035) (0.166) (0.070)
BDSIZE 0.022 2.08 −0.002 −0.14 0.036 3.56
(0.294) (0.939) (0.071)
LIT −0.073 −1.76 −0.089 −1.97 −0.294 −7.11
(0.741) (0.647) (0.160)
SIZE −0.026 −1.44 0.084 4.20 0.045 2.52
(0.639) (0.116) (0.363)
MTB 0.001 0.08 0.010 0.56 −0.017 −1.09
(0.930) (0.481) (0.199)
D CAP 0.288 6.79 0.369 8.45 0.182 4.48
(0.004) (0.001) (0.059)
ROA −2.221 −3.69 0.697 1.07 −1.712 −2.89
(0.001) (0.250) (0.008)
B AR −0.193 −4.28 0.962 23.16
(0.017) (0.001)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.300 0.296 0.317
N 4,415 4,415 4,415
Model:
PROB(VDi,t+1 = 1) = α + β1FOWN i,t + β2INST i,t + β3BLOCK i,t + β4ACi,t + β5DISPi,t
+β6RVOLi,t + β7BDINDi,t + β8BDSIZEi,t + β9LIT i,t + β10SIZEi,t
+β11MTBi,t + β12 D CAPi,t+1 + β13ROAi,t+1 + β14 B ARi,t+1
+
∑year
dummies
+
∑industry
dummies
+ εi,t (1)
The dependent variable, VD, in column 1 (2, 3) equals 1 if the firm issued at least one management forecast (one
good news forecast, one bad news forecast) in year t+1. Management forecasts with positive (negative) three-day
CARs centered on the forecast date are classified as good (bad) news forecasts.
FOWN is defined as follows for each panel:
1) Panel A, FOWN = an indicator variable, coded as 1 for firms where the founding family members continue to
hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders of the firms;
2) Panel B, FOWN = equity ownership by founding family members;
3) Panel C, FOWN = an indicator variable, coded as 1 if family ownership is at least 5%.
All other variables are as defined in table 3. Year dummies and industry dummies are included in each
specification, and for the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies are not reported. For each variable, the
coefficient estimate (the two-sided p-value) is reported in the top (bottom) row. All p-values are based on standard
errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. Marginal change in probability is calculated as the change in the likelihood
of having a management forecast when the underlying variable changes from the first to the third quartile of the
sample distribution, or from 0 to 1 in the case of dummy variables, holding all other independent variables at their
respective means.
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contemporaneous ROA does not affect the probability of issuing good news
forecasts, it is significantly negatively associated with the probability of is-
suing bad news forecasts. Naturally, when the performance is poor (B AR
equal to one), firms are more likely to disclose bad news and less likely to
disclose good news forecasts.
To gauge the economic significance of the impact of founding family
presence on voluntary disclosure, we estimate the marginal change in the
probability of voluntary disclosure for each of the independent variables. It is
calculated as the change in the likelihood of having a management forecast
when the underlying variable changes from the first to the third quartile of
the sample distribution, or from zero to one in the case of dummy variables,
holding all other independent variables at their respective means. Results
in panel A show that the probability of providing management forecasts is
8.07 percentage points lower for family firms than for nonfamily firms. This
impact is higher than that of other variables, with the exception of analyst
coverage. The probability of providing good (bad) news forecasts is 8.99
(5.43) percentage points lower for family firms than for nonfamily firms;
this effect is economically significant considering that only 36% (44%) of
the sample have good (bad) news forecasts.
The above analysis is based on the widely used definition of family firm—
firms where founding family members serve as top executives, a director,
or a blockholder. Panels B and C report the regression results using two
alternative proxies to capture the presence of founding families: (1) con-
tinuous family ownership and (2) a family blockholder indicator (family
ownership of 5% or higher), respectively. As indicated in the two panels,
the proxy for family presence, FOWN , has significantly negative coefficients
in all models. The marginal change in management forecast probability is
also qualitatively similar to those reported in panel A.
To sum up, the results in table 4 suggest that, relative to nonfamily
firms, family firms are less likely to provide voluntary disclosure, regard-
less of the nature of the news. This result suggests that the combined ef-
fects of family owners’ longer investment horizon, better monitoring of
management, better access to information, and concerns with the cost of
providing timely information outweigh the potential lower cost of capital
benefits to family owners through voluntary disclosure, and that family own-
ers’ influence in the firm can tilt firms’ disclosure practices toward their
preferences.
4.3 ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT FORECASTS OF DIFFERENT HORIZONS
Managers likely issue forecasts of different horizons for different reasons.
For example, short-run forecasts might be mainly driven by period-specific
performance (e.g., Skinner [1994], Miller [2002]). In addition, litigation
cost concerns apply more to a short-run setting because failing to warn in-
vestors of potential upcoming bad news is easier to confirm when earnings
are soon to be released (Skinner [1994], Kasznik and Lev [1995]). In con-
trast, issuing long-run management forecasts is motivated more by reducing
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information asymmetry. Thus, in this section we investigate whether the
lower likelihood of management forecasts in family firms as reported above
holds for management forecasts of different forecast horizons, specifically,
earnings warnings, short-run management forecasts, and long-run manage-
ment forecasts. Like prior research (e.g., Miller [2002]), we refer to forecasts
issued after the fiscal period-end but before the earnings announcement
date of the forecasted period as earnings warnings, forecasts with horizons
(the number of days between the management forecast issuance date and
earnings announcement date) longer than a quarter as long-run forecasts,
and all other forecasts as short-run forecasts.
Table 5 presents the regression results, panel A for earnings warnings
and panel B for short-run and long-run earnings forecasts. The model
specification is similar to equation (1), except that we add a short-run perfor-
mance variable, seasonal change in earnings per share scaled by beginning-
of-quarter stock price (EPS), in the analysis of earnings warnings and short-
run forecasts because they are more likely to be driven by period-specific
performance. Also, since the decision to issue an earnings warnings or a
short-run forecast is made within a quarter, we examine observations at the
quarterly level, leading to 16,253 firm-quarter observations for the analysis
of earnings warnings and short-run forecasts.17
This analysis yields some very interesting results. While family firms are less
likely to issue good news, regardless of the horizon, their behavior in the case
of bad news varies with forecast horizon. In panel A, column 3, we document
a positive coefficient on the family firm indicator, FOWN . That is, family firms
are more likely to give out bad news earnings warnings than nonfamily firms,
consistent with family owners having greater litigation cost and reputation
cost concerns. In contrast, the coefficient on FOWN continues to be negative
for long-run forecasts in the case of bad news (insignificant for short-run
forecasts).
By separately examining forecasts of different horizons, we significantly
extend the results in Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007]: While family
firms are less likely to issue long-run management forecasts, regardless of
the news contents, they are more likely to give out earnings warnings when
firm performance is bad. This indicates that both forces, that is, (1) family
owners’ preferences for less disclosure arising from their long investment
horizon and effective monitoring of managers and (2) their incentives to
reduce litigation and reputation costs of not disclosing bad news, are im-
portant in shaping family firms’ disclosure practices. These results are con-
sistent with family owners acting in their own best interests, and they do not
necessarily indicate that family owners reduce agency problems via more
disclosures.
17 We use the family firm indicator variable in table 5 as we are primarily interested in the
different disclosure behavior between family and nonfamily firms. Using alternative family
presence proxies, as in section 4.2, yields qualitatively similar results.
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T A B L E 5
Analysis of Management Forecasts of Different Horizons
Panel A: Logistic regression results for earnings warnings
1 2 3
All management Good news Bad news
forecasts forecasts forecasts
Intercept −5.222 −7.432 −7.181
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FOWN −0.092 −0.824 0.305
(0.418) (0.001) (0.023)
INST 0.774 0.928 1.020
(0.010) (0.035) (0.006)
BLOCK −0.005 0.048 0.063
(0.965) (0.804) (0.670)
AC 0.043 0.054 0.044
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DISP −0.940 −0.740 −1.250
(0.018) (0.278) (0.029)
RVOL 25.491 31.548 19.833
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
BDIND 0.402 −0.381 0.794
(0.188) (0.398) (0.032)
BDSIZE −0.001 −0.102 0.045
(0.951) (0.009) (0.095)
LIT 0.342 0.784 −0.006
(0.075) (0.009) (0.979)
SIZE −0.127 0.027 −0.182
(0.016) (0.762) (0.005)
MTB −0.056 −0.076 −0.056
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
D CAP 0.063 −0.107 0.087
(0.562) (0.536) (0.556)
ROA −2.797 −0.282 −4.216
(0.001) (0.746) (0.001)
EPS −21.095 17.879 −52.989
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
B AR −0.577 0.837
(0.001) (0.001)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.181 0.262 0.223
N 16,253 16,253 16,253
(Continued)
4.4 CONTRASTING THE IMPACT OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP ON VOLUNTARY
DISCLOSURE WITH THAT OF CONCENTRATED INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS
AND NONFAMILY INSIDER OWNERSHIP
As discussed above, Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta [2005] and
Karamanou and Vafeas [2005] find a negative impact on voluntary dis-
closure of concentrated ownership of institutional investors and insiders,
without separating family insiders from nonfamily insiders. Family owners
differ from nonfamily insiders and institutional owners with concentrated
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T A B L E 5 —Continued
Panel B: Logistic regression results for short-run and long-run management forecasts
Short-run management Long-run management
forecasts forecasts
1 2 3 1 2 3
All Good Bad All Good Bad
management news news management news news
forecasts forecasts forecasts forecasts forecasts forecasts
Intercept −7.344 −9.830 −9.217 −4.344 −4.810 −5.886
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FOWN −0.127 −0.166 −0.099 −0.452 −0.495 −0.380
(0.078) (0.072) (0.283) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
INST −0.029 −0.230 0.095 0.780 0.719 0.462
(0.893) (0.414) (0.650) (0.005) (0.013) (0.108)
BLOCK 0.081 0.303 −0.114 0.009 0.122 0.058
(0.374) (0.018) (0.211) (0.934) (0.352) (0.601)
AC 0.040 0.067 0.028 0.058 0.066 0.039
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DISP −2.461 −1.696 −3.783 −1.813 −1.183 −2.610
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.047) (0.001)
RVOL 10.402 12.708 10.649 −5.002 −12.285 −0.065
(0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.371) (0.048) (0.991)
BDIND 0.545 0.446 0.837 0.447 0.337 0.338
(0.030) (0.183) (0.002) (0.131) (0.304) (0.270)
BDSIZE 0.031 0.062 0.016 0.052 0.028 0.078
(0.099) (0.011) (0.390) (0.017) (0.228) (0.001)
LIT 0.019 −0.095 0.097 −0.363 −0.373 −0.306
(0.922) (0.663) (0.606) (0.100) (0.089) (0.144)
SIZE 0.166 0.165 0.170 0.033 0.039 0.051
(0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.548) (0.515) (0.352)
MTB 0.013 0.000 0.010 0.028 0.002 0.023
(0.221) (0.974) (0.365) (0.042) (0.914) (0.075)
D CAP 0.189 0.092 0.213 0.223 0.367 0.172
(0.025) (0.413) (0.021) (0.026) (0.001) (0.099)
ROA 0.159 0.407 0.615 −0.713 1.132 −0.360
(0.755) (0.538) (0.257) (0.267) (0.109) (0.606)
EPS −24.306 16.383 −49.639
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
B AR −0.533 0.815 −0.210 0.612
(0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.001)
(Continued)
ownership (e.g., pension funds and mutual funds) along several dimen-
sions. First, family owners have longer investment horizons than nonfamily
insiders. The founding family tends to hold shares for generations, whereas
nonfamily insiders generally do not hold shares beyond their tenure in the
firm, which is relatively short.18 Second, family owners are less diversified
and the value of the firm has a larger impact on family owners’ investment
18 For example, Joos, Leone, and Zimmerman [2003] report that the average tenure of
CEOs in nonfamily firms is 8 years, while the average tenure for CEOs who are founding family
members is over 17 years and the CEO title is often passed from one family member to another.
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T A B L E 5 —Continued
Panel B: Logistic regression results for short-run and long-run management forecasts
Short-run management Long-run management
forecasts forecasts
1 2 3 1 2 3
All Good Bad All Good Bad
management news news management news news
forecasts forecasts forecasts forecasts forecasts forecasts
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.278 0.285 0.274 0.315 0.314 0.300
N 16,253 16,253 16,253 4,415 4,415 4,415
Model for earnings warnings and short-run forecasts, estimated at the firm-quarter level:
PROB(VDi,t+1,q = 1) = α + β1FOWN i,t + β2INST i,t + β3BLOCK i,t + β4ACi,t + β5DISPi,t
+β6RVOLi,t + β7BDINDi,t + β8BDSIZEi,t + β9LIT i,t + β10SIZEi,t
+ β11MTBi,t + β12 D CAPi,t+1 + β13ROAi,t+1 + β14EPSi,t+1,q
+β15 B ARi,t+1 +
∑year
dummies
+
∑industry
dummies
+ εi,t,q
Model for long-run forecasts, estimated at the firm-year level:
PROB(VDi,t+1 = 1) = α + β1FOWN i,t + β2INST i,t + β3BLOCK i,t + β4ACi,t + β5DISPi,t
+β6RVOLi,t + β7BDINDi,t + β8BDSIZEi,t + β9LIT i,t + β10SIZEi,t
+β11MTBi,t + β12 D CAPi,t+1 + β13ROAi,t+1
+β14 B ARi,t+1 +
∑year
dummies
+
∑industry
dummies
+ εi,t
Definition of VD for each panel:
1) For the earnings warning test (panel A), the dependent variable, VD, in column 1 (2, 3) equals 1 if
the firm issues at least one earnings warning (one good news warning, one bad news warning) in
quarter q of year t+1, where earnings warnings refer to management forecasts issued after the fiscal
period end but before the earnings announcement date.
2) For the short-run management forecast test (panel B), the dependent variable, VD, in column 1 (2,
3) equals 1 if the firm issues at least one management forecast (one good news forecast, one bad
news forecast) with horizons less than 92 days—about the length of a quarter—in quarter q of year
t+1, excluding earnings warnings.
3) For the long-run management forecast test (panel B), the dependent variable, VD, in column 1 (2,
3) equals 1 if the firm issues at least one management forecast (one good news forecast, one bad
news forecast) with horizons greater than 92 days in year t + 1.
For all three panels, FOWN refers to the family firm indicator, coded as 1 for firms where the founding
family members continue to hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders of
the firms. Management forecasts with positive (negative) three-day CARs centered on the forecast date are
classified as good (bad) news forecasts. For the tests of earnings warnings and short-run forecasts, EPS
is equal to seasonal change in earnings per share scaled by beginning of quarter stock price. All other
variables are as defined in table 3. Year dummies and industry dummies are included in each specification
and for the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies are not reported. For each variable, the coefficient
estimate (the two-sided p-value) is reported in the top (bottom) row. All p-values are based on standard
errors adjusted for firm-level clustering.
portfolios than on large institutional investors’ investment portfolios. Third,
unlike family owners, large institutional investors usually do not sit on the
board of the firms they are holding and thus have less influence over volun-
tary disclosure. Thus, compared to large institutional investors and nonfam-
ily insiders, family owners’ longer investment horizon, greater commitment
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to the firm, and more active involvement in the management can lead to a
greater impact on voluntary disclosure practices.
To contrast the impact of family ownership (FOWN ) on voluntary dis-
closure with that of nonfamily insider ownership (NF INSIDER) and con-
centrated institutional holdings (CON INST), we add these two ownership
variables into regression equation (1):
PROB(V Di,t+1 = 1)
= α + β1FOWN i,t + β2NF INSIDERi,t + β3CON INST i,t
+β4INST i,t + β5BLOCK i,t + β6ACi,t + β7DISPi,t + β8RVOLi,t
+ β9BDINDi,t + β10BDSIZEi,t + β11LIT i,t + β12SIZEi,t + β13MTBi,t
+ β14 D CAPi,t+1 + β15ROAi,t+1 + β16 B ARi,t+1
+
Year∑
Dummies
+
Industry∑
Dummies
+εi,t (2)
To ensure that our inferences are not driven by one particular measure, we
capture concentrated institutional ownership in three ways: (1) ownership
of the top five institutional investors (TOP5 INST), as in Ajinkya, Bhojraj,
and Sengupta [2005], (2) ownership of the dedicated institutional investors
per Bushee’s [1998] classification (DED INST), and (3) ownership by long-
term institutional investors (LT INST), classified using institutional owner-
ship turnover calculated as in Gaspar, Massa, and Matos [2005]. Specifically,
we classify firms with an average institutional investor turnover measure in
the bottom quartile of the sample distribution as firms with long-term in-
stitutional investors, and then define long-term institutional ownership as
the total institutional ownership for these firms and zero for other firms. All
other variables are defined as in equation (1). To facilitate the comparison
across the three types of ownership, we use family ownership, rather than a
family firm indicator, in the regressions.
The regression results are reported in table 6. The results on control
variables are very similar to those reported before, and for the sake of parsi-
mony, we do not report them here, except for total institutional ownership
(INST).19 The results indicate that, after controlling for family ownership,
neither nonfamily insider ownership nor concentrated institutional owner-
ship, however measured, has incremental power in explaining good news
or bad news disclosure. At the same time, the family ownership variable is
significantly negative in all specifications. While our analyses without distin-
guishing insider ownership by the family/nonfamily dichotomy (not tabu-
lated) yield results that corroborate existing research, the results in table 6
19 Note that the coefficient on concentrated institutional ownership captures the incremen-
tal impact of concentrated institutional ownership over that of INST . The results on INST are
qualitatively similar to those reported in table 4.
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indicate that family ownership dominates concentrated institutional owner-
ship and nonfamily insider ownership in explaining the voluntary disclosure
propensity.
4.5 WITHIN-SAMPLE VARIATION: THE INCREMENTAL IMPACT
OF FAMILY CEO, HIGH FAMILY OWNERSHIP, AND BOARD
OF DIRECTORS REPRESENTATION
Not all family firms are the same: We observe considerable variation of
families’ involvement in management, equity ownership, and board repre-
sentations across family firms, and family firms’ voluntary disclosure prac-
tices might vary with these characteristics. Specifically, it is likely that found-
ing families with family members being CEOs, with high family ownership,
or with large representation on the board of directors have a longer in-
vestment horizon, greater influence in corporate management, and more
insider information about the firm. If so, it then follows that these family
firms prefer even less public disclosure than other family firms.20 In this
section we explore whether this is the case.
As reported in panel A of table 7, about 62% of our family firms are
managed by family CEOs (1,271 of 2,043 firm-years) whereas the rest are
managed by professional CEOs. There is large variation in family owner-
ship. About 70% of family firms have family ownership of 5% or higher and
about 25% of family firms have family ownership of 25% or higher. Panel A
of table 7 also shows that over 98% of the families have at least one family
member sitting on the board of directors, and about 23% have at least three
family members on the board. Panel B of table 7 presents logistic regression
results. We estimate equation (1) after adding, alternatively, a family CEO
indicator (F CEO), a high equity ownership indicator for firms with fam-
ily ownership greater than 25% (which coincides with the third quartile of
family ownership distribution) (H FOWN ), and a high board presence indi-
cator coded as one for firms with at least three family members sitting on the
board (H FDIR). The coefficients on these indicator variables capture the
incremental impact of family CEO, high family ownership, and high fam-
ily board representation on management forecasts, on top of the impact
of family equity ownership. We use family equity ownership in this set of
analyses because these characteristics are correlated with family ownership
and we wish to capture their incremental effect over family ownership. For
parsimony, we do not report the results on control variables.
Results show that the family equity ownership variable continues to be
significantly negative in all specifications. We find a significantly negative
coefficient on F CEO for good news forecasts, and all other coefficients on
20 Prior research finds that family CEOs are less likely to be replaced after poor perfor-
mance than professional CEOs (e.g., Chen, Cheng, and Dai [2007]) and that CEO job security
concerns can lead to earnings management (Fudenberg and Tirole [1995], DeFond and Park
[1997]). These two findings indicate that family CEOs, with greater job security, have lower
incentives to manage earnings expectations via voluntary disclosure of timely information.
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F CEO, H FOWN , and H FDIR are insignificant. These results indicate that
the relationship between management forecasts and family equity owner-
ship is linear, with family CEO having some incremental effect on good
news forecasts.
4.6 USING CONFERENCE CALLS AS AN ALTERNATIVE PROXY
OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
In this section we use the probability of holding conference calls as an
alternative measure of voluntary disclosure. Compared to management fore-
casts, conference calls, which are usually held together with or immediately
after earnings announcements, generally contain a richer information set,
ranging from detailed explanations of current performance to predictions
of industry trends and firm performance. The question-and-answer session
between management and analysts in conference calls can further reveal
valuable information about the firm. On the other hand, the fact that con-
ference calls are often jointly held with earnings announcements makes it
difficult to classify the nature of the news in conference calls, unlike in the
case of management forecasts. Also, since conference calls are more “sticky”
than management forecasts, managers have less discretion on the decision
to hold conference calls.
We present our analysis using conference calls to proxy for voluntary dis-
closure in table 8. Panel A shows that over 79% of the sample observations
have conference calls; many firms have multiple conference calls per year.
Panel B shows that, at the univariate level, family firms have fewer conference
calls than nonfamily firms. Panel C presents the regression results using the
same three proxies for family presence as in table 4, a family firm indicator,
family equity ownership, and a family blockholder indicator, and using the
same model specification as for total management forecasts.21 FOWN is sig-
nificantly negative in all three models, confirming our results documented
in table 4. This result suggests that the propensity of less voluntary disclosure
in family firms applies to conference calls as well.
4.7 ADDITIONAL SENSITIVITY TESTS
4.7.1. Controlling for Firm Age. In this section, we examine whether the
reported results are driven by firm age. Firm age can conceivably be corre-
lated with both firm type and firms’ voluntary disclosure, since family firms
are on average younger than nonfamily firms and a firm’s disclosure prac-
tice likely varies with the maturity of its public relation. For this purpose,
we conduct two separate tests: (1) adding the log transformation of firm
age into equation (1), and (2) running equation (1) by firm age quartile.
21 As we do not classify conference calls into good news or bad news, we do not include B AR
in the logit regressions on conference calls, consistent with the model specification for total
management forecasts. Including this variable leads to very similar inferences.
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Testing Hypothesis: Using Conference Calls to Proxy for Voluntary Disclosure
Panel A: Conference call frequency for the full sample
Number of
Number of conference calls observations Percent
0 921 20.86
1 357 8.09
2 379 8.58
3 617 13.98
4 951 21.54
5 701 15.88
6 279 6.32
7 102 2.31
8 47 1.06
9 24 0.54
10 and above 37 0.82
Total 4,415 100.0
Panel B: Comparison of conference call frequency across firm types
The last two columns report the two-sided p-value for the difference between family and nonfamily
firms in means and medians, respectively. t-tests (Wilcoxon tests) are used to test the difference
in means (medians).
Family firms Nonfamily firms p-value of the
(N = 2,043) (N = 2,372) difference
Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Median
Number of conference calls 2.995 2.412 3 3.198 2.221 4 0.004 0.001
Panel C: Logistic regression using conference call indicator as dependent variable
1 2 3
FOWN = FOWN = FOWN =
family family alternative family
firm equity firm indicator
indicator ownership (family ownership ≥ 5%)
Intercept −7.921 −7.650 −7.457
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FOWN −0.239 −1.398 −0.578
(0.082) (0.012) (0.001)
INST 2.100 1.990 1.900
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BLOCK 0.286 0.224 0.307
(0.066) (0.170) (0.053)
AC 0.102 0.098 0.098
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DISP −0.494 −0.462 −0.628
(0.183) (0.205) (0.075)
RVOL 43.441 41.572 43.985
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
BDIND 1.403 1.282 1.045
(0.001) (0.003) (0.018)
BDSIZE −0.032 −0.037 −0.030
(0.323) (0.261) (0.358)
LIT −0.343 −0.274 −0.334
(0.376) (0.479) (0.394)
SIZE 0.436 0.448 0.433
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MTB 0.039 0.037 0.035
(0.148) (0.170) (0.189)
(Continued)
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T A B L E 8 —Continued
Panel C: Logistic regression using conference call indicator as dependent variable
1 2 3
FOWN = FOWN = FOWN =
family family alternative family
firm equity firm indicator
indicator ownership (family ownership ≥5%)
D CAP 0.861 0.812 0.806
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA 0.708 1.088 0.872
(0.473) (0.271) (0.368)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.553 0.552 0.554
N 4,415 4,415 4,415
Model:
PROB(VD CCi,t+1 = 1) = α + β1FOWN i,t + β2INST i,t + β3BLOCK i,t + β4ACi,t + β5DISPi,t
+β6RVOLi,t + β7BDINDi,t + β8BDSIZEi,t + β9LIT i,t + β10SIZEi,t + β11MTBi,t
+β12 D CAPi,t+1 + β13ROAi,t+1 +
∑year
dummies
+
∑industry
dummies
+ εi,t (4)
The dependent variable VD CC equals 1 if the firm holds at least one conference call in year t+1. The
definition of FOWN is as follows for each column:
1) FOWN = an indicator variable coded as 1 for firms where the founding family members continue to
hold positions in top management, are on the board, or are blockholders of the firms;
2) FOWN = equity ownership by founding family members;
3) FOWN = an indicator variable, coded as 1 if family ownership is at least 5%.
All other variables are as defined in table 3. Year dummies and industry dummies are included in each
specification, and for the sake of brevity, the results for these dummies are not reported. For each variable,
the coefficient estimate (the two-sided p-value) is reported in the top (bottom) row. All p-values are based
on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering.
The average firm age, the number of years from the founding year to the
current year, is 48 for family firms, but 73 for nonfamily firms. After firm
age is added as an additional control, our results show that the family firm
indicator is still significantly negative in all specifications. The coefficient
on firm age is negative, consistent with younger firms being less likely to
issue management forecasts. When estimating equation (1) by age quartile,
we find that the family firm indicator is significantly negative in all models
except in two cases of bad news disclosure (of 12 models, i.e., 3 models ×
4 age quartiles). Based on these results, we conclude that our results are
robust to controlling for firm age.22
4.7.2. Management Forecasts Concurrent with Earnings Announcements. Re-
call that we classify the news contained in management forecasts based on
22 Because the founding year is only available for 85% of our sample (i.e., 3,768 observa-
tions), we also measure firm age as the number of years the firm has been covered by CRSP, a
common practice in the literature. The coefficients on the family firm dummy are significantly
negative throughout, but the coefficient on the CRSP firm age is insignificant.
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the sign of the three-day abnormal returns centered on forecast date. This
classification is confounded if forecasts are issued concurrently with earn-
ings announcements. We conduct two tests: (1) classifying news based on the
comparison between management forecasts and the latest analyst forecasts
and (2) excluding such management forecasts, and find that the inferences
remain the same.
4.7.3. Analysis of Subsamples: S&P 500 versus S&P 400 and S&P 600 Firms.
To gauge whether our main results are driven by larger or smaller firms
in our sample, we repeat the analyses by separately analyzing large firms
(S&P 500 firms) and small firms (S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600
firms). The results for these two subsamples are similar to those for the full
sample.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of founding family ownership on vol-
untary disclosure practices. Family firms account for 46% of S&P 1500 firms
and family ownership averages as high as 18% in family firms. The unique
characteristics of family owners imply that family owners have different pref-
erences for voluntary disclosure than other owners, but the direction of the
prediction is unclear ex ante. The longer investment horizon, better mon-
itoring of management, and better access to information of family owners
leads to the prediction of less voluntary disclosure in family firms, but at
the same time the benefits of voluntary disclosure, through the reduction
in the cost of capital, leads to the prediction of more voluntary disclosure
in family firms.
Using management forecasts as the proxy for voluntary disclosure, we find
that relative to nonfamily firms, family firms tend to disclose less, regardless
of whether the disclosure reveals good news or bad news. The lower likeli-
hood of voluntary disclosure holds for two alternative proxies of family pres-
ence (family equity ownership and the existence of a family blockholder)
and for an alternative empirical proxy for voluntary disclosure—conference
calls.
Our results extend recent studies on the association between firms’ own-
ership structure and voluntary disclosure. Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta
[2005] and Karamanou and Vafeas [2005] document that the likelihood
of management forecasts decreases with concentrated institutional hold-
ings and insider ownership. We find that the impact of these two vari-
ables is no longer significant once family ownership is controlled for, in-
dicating that family owners play a more dominant role in influencing
firms’ voluntary disclosure practices than other investors with concentrated
ownership.
Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan [2007] find that, among S&P 500 firms,
family firms are more likely to provide quarterly forecasts than nonfamily
firms when firm performance is poor. We extend their study by separately
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examining earnings warnings and earnings forecasts. We document that
family firms are more likely to provide bad news earnings warnings but are
less likely to provide earnings forecasts. While the former result is consistent
with family owners’ greater litigation and reputation cost concerns, the latter
result is consistent with the lower information asymmetry between owners
and managers in family firms and family owners’ concerns with the potential
cost of providing timely information.
Overall, our research contributes to the literature by providing further
evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and voluntary
disclosure. Our finding suggests that family owners’ long investment hori-
zon, the lower information asymmetry between family owners and managers,
and family owners’ litigation and reputation cost concerns influence firms’
voluntary disclosure practices in systematic ways.
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